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The Prosecutor Circumvents the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel with a Simple
"Wink and Nod"
United States v. Johnson'
I. INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel2 embodies an internal clash between
two important societal interests: effective law enforcement and fair play within
our adversarial justice system.3 While this conflict is significant when known
government agents, like uniformed police officers, attempt to obtain
incriminating statements from criminal defendants, the conflict is intensified
when undercover agents elicit incriminating statements from defendants. Thus,
the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit have consistently upheld Sixth Amendment protections
against overzealous law enforcement practices involving undercover and
jailhouse informants.4
This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in United States
v. Johnson5 severely limits a defendant's protections against the government's
intentional use of implicit, or "wink and nod," agreements with undercover
informants to circumvent the right to counsel. Although the court's decision may
further the interests of effective law enforcement, the resulting sacrifice of fair
play in the adversarial justice system is too costly for society to bear.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1993, a federal grand jury indicted Dustin Honken on a conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine charge.6 During the federal government's
investigation of the conspiracy, five witnesses who were going to testify against
Honken disappeared.7 The lack of witnesses forced the prosecutor to abandon

1. 338 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2003).

2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984); James J. Tomkovicz, An
Adversary System Defense ofthe Right to CounselAgainstInformants: Truth, FairPlay,

and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1, 1 (1988).
4. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d
994 (8th Cir. 2002).

5. 338 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2003).
6. Id. at 919.
7. Id. The witnesses included three adults and the two young daughters of one of

the adults. Id.
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his case against Honken, but federal investigators continued to investigate the
conspiracy and the disappearance of the witnesses.8
The investigation later focused on Angela Johnson, Honken's girlfriend at
the time of the disappearances.9 In July of 2000, a grand jury indicted Johnson
for "aiding and abetting the murder of the five witnesses, aiding and abetting the
solicitation of the murder of witnesses, and conspiring to interfere with
witnesses."' She was subsequently arrested on July 30,2000." The prosecutor
then intervened by placing Johnson in the Benton County Jail instead of "the
Linn County Jail, where [she] would ordinarily have been placed upon her
12
arrest.'

At the time Johnson was sent to the Benton County Jail, the prosecutor
knew that Robert McNeese, an inmate who had a history of providing
information he gathered in prison in exchange for favorable treatment, was
already housed in the Benton County Jail. 3 Within eight days, McNeese
established contact with Ms. Johnson. 4 McNeese and Johnson communicated

frequently thereafter. 5 A month later, McNeese informed an investigator that
he had obtained incriminating statements from Johnson. 6 The investigator told
McNeese not to get further information from Johnson until the investigator could
obtain instructions from the prosecutor concerning how the situation should be
handled."

Five days later, on September 11,2000, McNeese received "listening-post"
instructions regarding Johnson." McNeese then signed a plea agreement in
which he would receive favorable treatment in exchange for extracting
information from Johnson and cooperating in future cases that might arise in the

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 875 (N.D. Iowa 2002), rev'd,
338 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2003).
13. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 919.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 919-20.
16. Id. at 920; Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 818. The investigator, who worked for
the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, was the same investigator who had arrested
Johnson and, as directed by the prosecutor, transported her to the Benton County Jail.
Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
17. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 920.
18. Id. The instructions first listed all of the contacts McNeese previously had with
Johnson. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 821. Next, the instructions explained that

McNeese should not initiate any conversation with Johnson or any other inmate regarding
past criminal conduct in order to elicit information about that conduct, but that McNeese
may listen to any statements regarding past criminal conduct, unless the statements were
protected by legal privilege. Id. at 821-22.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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Northern District of Iowa. 9 Two weeks later, McNeese disclosed the
incriminating statements he elicited from Johnson.2"
The prosecutor then filed a notice of intent to use Johnson's disclosures as
evidence against her.2' Johnson subsequently moved to suppress the evidence,
contending that because McNeese acted as a government agent who deliberately
obtained the incriminating statements from her, use of the statements would
violate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.22 After an evidentiary hearing,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa granted
Johnson's motion and suppressed Johnson's disclosures to McNeese.23 In this
ruling, the court rejected the Eighth Circuit's bright-line agency rule requiring
that an inmate acting as a government agent must receive instructions targeting
the particular defendant.24 Instead, the court analyzed the question ofMcNeese's
agency in light of all the circumstances, including the possibility that an implicit
or tacit agreement targeting Johnson existed between the prosecutor and
McNeese.2 5 Thus, the court held that because of his "symbiotic relationship"
with the government as a long-standing jailhouse informant who was led to
believe that providing incriminating statements from inmates would result in
favorable treatment, McNeese was acting as a government agent before
September 11, 2000.26
The prosecutor appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed.27 The court applied its previously-adopted bright-line
rule stating, "'only when the informant has been instructed by the police to get
information about the particular defendant' will the informant be a government
agent.28 The court held that this language could not be explained away, and thus,

19. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 920.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 919.
23. Id. at 920 (citing Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795).
24. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
25. Id.
26. Id. In support of this holding, the court found:
[B]oth that the government "intentionally created" the opportunity to
circumvent Johnson's right to counsel, by placing Johnson in a jail like the
Benton County Jail with McNeese, and that the government "must have
known that [the] propinquinty [of McNeese and Johnson in that jail] likely
would lead to [securing incriminating information]," owing to what
government officials knew or should have known about the nature of that jail.
Id. at 875-76 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271
(1980)).
27. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 919.
28. Id. at 922 (quoting Moore v. United States, 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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McNeese was not acting as a government agent before receiving the listeningpost instructions on September 11, 2000.29
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment ensures that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ...

to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defense."3 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that this right first
attaches upon the initiation of formal charges against the accused. 3 When the
prosecutor initiates formal charges, the government's role shifts from
investigation to accusation, and the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel must then take effect.32
Once the government's role becomes accusatory, the adversarial process
commences and government agents cannot deliberately attempt to obtain
incriminating statements from the accused without the presence of counsel.33 If
incriminating statements are obtained from the defendant without counsel
present, the defendant can prove that the incriminating evidence was obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment by showing (1) that the right to counsel had
attached, (2) that the informant was a government agent, and (3) that the
informant deliberately elicited the incriminating statements.3 4 If a court finds
that the accused has met all three elements, she is entitled to suppression of the
incriminating evidence at trial.35
B. The "DeliberateElicitation"Rule in Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court first recognized the prohibition of the "deliberate

elicitation" of evidence from a criminal defendant in the absence of counsel in
Massiah v. UnitedStates.3 6 In Massiah, the defendant was indicted on narcotics

29. Id. But "[a]ll parties agree[d] that Mr. McNeese was acting as a government
agent from this point forward." Id. at 920.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 299 (1990) (concluding that the Sixth Amendment precedents were not
applicable to the defendant's case because "no charges had been filed on the subject of
the interrogation" at the time he was interrogated).
32. Moran, 475 U.S. at 430.
33. Id. at 43 1.
34. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201,206 (1964).
35. Henry, 447 U.S. at 270; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.

36. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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charges and subsequently posted bail.17 Unbeknownst to Massiah, a codefendant, Colson, had begun cooperating with the police.3" The police
convinced Colson to put a radio transmitter in his car with which they monitored
Colson and Massiah's conversations.39 In one of these conversations, Massiah
made incriminating statements. 4° The prosecutor then used these statements
against Massiah at trial.4' Massiah objected to the use of the evidence on the
grounds that the statements were elicited in the absence of counsel, but the court
overruled his objection and the jury convicted him.42
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.43 The Court found that after
Massiah's indictment, federal agents "deliberately elicited" incriminating
statements from him "in the absence of his counsel." According to the Court,
when the trial court allowed the use of the incriminating evidence against
Massiah, the trial court denied Massiah the basic protections of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 41 In later cases, including Brewer v. Williams,"
United States v. Henry,47 Maine v. Moulton, 4 and Kuhlmann v. Wilson," the
Court further elucidated the meaning of deliberate elicitation.
In Brewer v. Williams, the Court analyzed a conversation between the
defendant and a police detective."0 In that case, police were investigating the
abduction of a young girl from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa.5 Two days later,
Williams, a recently-escaped mental patient who was a resident of the YMCA,
phoned a Des Moines attorney, McKnight, requesting advice concerning the
disappearance. 2 McKnight advised Williams, who had fled to Davenport, Iowa,
to turn himself in to the police.5" A Davenport judge subsequently arraigned
Williams and provided another lawyer, Kelly, to assist him while in Davenport. 4
McKnight agreed to let the police transport Williams from Davenport to Des

37. Id.

38. Id. at 202.
39. Id. at 202-03.
40. Id. at 203.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 205-06.
430 U.S. 387 (1977).
447 U.S. 264 (1980).
474 U.S. 159 (1985).
477 U.S. 436 (1986).
Brewer, 430 U.S. 387.

51. Id. at 390.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 391.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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Moines on the condition that the police would not interrogate or mistreat him."
Both McKnight and Kelly advised Williams not to make any statements to the
police until after consulting with McKnight in Des Moines. 6 During the
transport, the police encouraged Williams to tell them what he had done with the
body so that the victim could have a proper "Christian burial.""7 Williams
ultimately made incriminating statements regarding the location of the body and
at trial the prosecutor used those statements to convict him.5"
The Supreme Court overturned the conviction, concluding that the
"'Christian burial speech' [was] tantamount to interrogation," making the
"circumstances of [the] case ... constitutionally indistinguishable from those
presented in Massiah v. United States."" The clear rule of Massiah, the Court

stated, "Is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an
individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government
interrogates him."6
The next case in this line of decisions, United States v. Henry, involved
another surreptitious acquisition of a defendant's incriminating statements as in
Massiah. Upon Henry's indictment for bank robbery, police incarcerated Henry
in the city jail.6 Soon thereafter, the FBI contacted Nichols, another inmate in
the jail, who previously worked as a paid informant for the FBI.62 An agent told
Nichols to be alert to statements made by any prisoners in the jail, including
Henry, but instructed Nichols not to initiate any conversation with Henry or
question him specifically about the bank robbery.6 3 Nichols later informed the
investigating agents that Henry had told him about the robbery, and the FBI paid
him for providing that information.64 During Henry's trial, Nichols testified that
Henry had explained certain details of the planning and execution of the robbery,
and a jury convicted Henry on the basis of Nichols' testimony.6
As the Supreme Court considered whether the government agent
"deliberately elicited" incriminating statements from Henry, the Court noted
several important factors." "First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a
paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than
a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 392-93.

58. Id. at 393-94.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 400.
Id. at401.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 265-66 (1980).
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.

66. Id. at 270.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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In light of these
at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols."67
factors, the Court found that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which
found for Henry, correctly analyzed the case according to the "deliberate
elicitation" standard.6" The Court noted that Nichols was a paid FBI informant
for more than a year, and the FBI agent was aware that Nichols could engage
Henry in conversations without arousing Henry's suspicion.69 The Court further
explained that even if the agent did not intend for Nichols to take affirmative
steps to secure incriminating statements from Henry, "he must have known that
such propinquity likely would lead to that result."7 Thus, the Court concluded,
by "intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government
violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."71
In Maine v.Moulton, the Court expanded the principles developed in
Massiah, Brewer, and Henry into an affirmative obligation by the government
"not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection
afforded by the right to counsel."" The Moulton Court explained that honoring
the right to counsel must mean more than merely preventing the accused from
obtaining the assistance of counsel.7 Otherwise, the Court reasoned, the right
would be of little use as a mechanism to protect fairness in an adversarial
proceeding. 4 Conversely, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment is not
violated if a government agent obtains incriminating statements by luck or
happenstance.7 5 The Supreme Court concluded, however, that knowing
exploitation of the opportunity to confront the defendant in the absence of
counsel "is as much a breach of the State's obligation not to circumvent the right
to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an
opportunity."7
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the most recent Supreme Court decision in the
Massiahline of cases, the Court further clarified the deliberate elicitation rule by
distinguishing between "mere listening" and "deliberate elicitation."77 The Court
first acknowledged that "the primary concern of the Massiah line of cases is
secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of police

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.at 271.
Id.at 270.
Id.at 271.
Id.at 274.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985).
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 176 (citing Henry, 477 U.S. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring)).
Id.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
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interrogation." 7 But because a government agent's acquisition of incriminating
statements by luck or happenstance does not involve secret interrogation by the
police, the Court reasoned, a defendant making a Massiah violation claim "must
demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely
listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks."7 9
C. Application of the "DeliberateElicitation" Rule in the
Eighth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit follows the
"deliberate elicitation" exclusionary rule developed in the Massiah line of
cases."0 In the Eighth Circuit, "[a]ny statement about the charged crime that
government agents deliberately elicit from a defendant without counsel present
after the defendant has been indicted must be suppressed under the Sixth
Amendment exclusionary rule."'" To make a successful "Massiah violation"
claim, a defendant must show (1) that the right to counsel had attached, (2) that
the informant was a government agent, and (3) that the informant deliberately
elicited statements from the defendant.8"
The Eighth Circuit recently clarified when the right to counsel attaches for
Massiah purposes.8 3 According to the court, the right to counsel attaches "at or
after the time judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant]
'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment. "'" The court also affirmed the right of the accused to rely on the
assistance of counsel as a medium between the accused and the authorities.8 "
In Moore v. UnitedStates, 6 the Eighth Circuit adopted a bright-line rule for
determining whether an informant is a government agent.87 The court
announced: "'An informant becomes a government agent for purposes of
[Massiah] only when the informant has been instructed by the police to get

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 713 (8th Cir. 2002).
81. Id.
82. United States v. Moore, 178 F.3d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1999). These are the same
factors listed in Massiah and Henry. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
83. Bird, 287 F.3d at 713.
84. Id. (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)).
85. Id. (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
86. 178 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 1999).
87. Id. at 999-1000. The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined "government
agent" for Sixth Amendment purposes. Matteo v. Superintendant, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d
877, 893 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing Dupree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793-94 (11 th
Cir. 1991)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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information about the particular defendant."' 8 The apparent rationale for
adopting this rule was that "[t]he 'primary concern' ofthe government informant
rule is to avoid 'secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the
equivalent of direct police interrogation."'"9
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In United States v. Johnson, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa's decision and held that McNeese was not a government agent
until he received the listening-post instructions on September 11, 2000.90
Applying the Moore definition of agency, the appellate court found that "Mr.
McNeese was not, at any time before September 11, 2000, instructed, either in
express words or by implication, to get information about Ms. Johnson."'" The
court acknowledged that McNeese had helped the government in the past, and
that he had proved himself an expert interrogator and informant.92 The court also
acknowledged that the government may have hoped that, when Johnson was
placed in the same institution as McNeese, McNeese might come up with helpful
information.93 The appellate court concluded, however, that all of these facts
taken together "do not amount to an instruction to Mr. McNeese to get
information about Ms. Johnson in particular."94
In support of its holding, the court admonished the district court for
declining to apply the rule of Moore.95 The plain language of Moore requiring
an instruction specifically targeting Johnson could not be explained away, the
court reasoned, and thus, Moore was binding precedent.9 6 Furthermore, the court
explained, even though the district court may have believed that Moore was an
incorrect application of Henry and other cases in the Massiah line resolving the
question of agency, the district court was not "free to depart from [the Moore
interpretation of agency]." 7

88. Moore, 178 F.3d at 999 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Birbal,
113 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1997)). The First and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted
this rule. See United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60 (1 st Cir. 1999); Stano v. Butterworth,
51 F.3d 942, 977 (11th Cir. 1995).
89. Birbal, 113 F.3d at 346 (quoting Stano, 51 F.3d at 977).
90. United States v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2003).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 922-23.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 922-23.
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9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 6
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

Judge Bye dissented.9" Contrary to the majority, he believed that the
government did instruct McNeese to obtain information from Johnson prior to
September 11, 2000." The majority's characterization of the facts, Judge Bye
explained, ignored some of the well-grounded findings of fact made by the trial
court.1 ° Judge Bye noted that Johnson "did not land in the same jail as
[McNeese] by happenstance," but instead the prosecutor directed the U.S.
Marshal to send her to the Benton County Jail, the only facility where McNeese
would have access to her.'0 ' Although the government argued that it placed
Johnson in the Benton County Jail for security reasons, Judge Bye explained that
the district court rejected the prosecutor's explanation as pretextual because of
"inconsistencies in the prosecutor's evidence and the testimony of the U.S.
Marshal indicating that prosecutors rarely direct the placement of prisoners.""0 2
Judge Bye saw no clear error in the district court's findings that the prosecutor
was motivated by an intent to circumvent Johnson's right to counsel.'
The final question considered by Judge Bye was whether the district court
erred in concluding that McNeese was a government agent when he interrogated
Johnson.' Judge Bye recognized that, according to the Moore rule, McNeese
was a government agent only ifhe was "instructed" by the government to acquire
information about Johnson.' Judge Bye noted that the majority recognized that
the instructions may be implied as well as express, and agreed that implied
instructions may satisfy the Moore rule. 0 6 The holdings of Massiah,Henry, and
Moulton would be diminished, Judge Bye explained, if the court were to "limit
agency to cases where the government gave the informant direct, explicit oral or
written instructions to obtain evidence regarding a defendant."'0 7
Judge Bye concluded that the acts of the prosecutor impliedly
communicated instructions to McNeese.'
To support his conclusion, Judge
Bye noted that McNeese knew the prosecutor well from prior dealings in which

98. Id. at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 924 (Bye, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 924-25 (Bye, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 925 (Bye, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting); see United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751,
753 (8th Cir. 2001) ("When a district court grants a motion to suppress evidence, we
review its findings of fact for clear error ....). Judge Bye also noted that McNeese
recognized the prosecutor's intent, stating, "In fact, McNeese correctly interpreted the
prosecutor's actions as an instruction to help the government obtain information from
Johnson, later saying he believed Johnson was incarcerated with him so he 'could work
her."' Johnson, 338 F.3d at 925 (Bye, J., dissenting).
104. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 925 (Bye, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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McNeese received a substantial reduction in his sentence.'° 9 The prosecutor sent
Johnson to the Benton County Jail for McNeese to interrogate her, Judge Bye
explained, and McNeese correctly interpreted the prosecutor's acts and obtained
the incriminating information."' According to Judge Bye, the meeting between
McNeese and Johnson "was purposefully arranged by the prosecutor to
'circumvent[ ] the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation
between the accused and a state agent."""' Because the prosecutor's acts
constituted an implied instruction to McNeese and because McNeese acted upon
the instruction and deliberately elicited the incriminating information from
Johnson, Judge Bye would have held that Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was violated and
the incriminating information could not "be used to
' 2
secure her conviction."
V. COMMENT

In making its ruling in Johnson, the majority substituted its judgment for
that of the trial court and applied the Moore rule to the Johnson facts. This
substitution was well within the power of the Eighth Circuit, for the district court
had improperly rejected the binding rule of Moore. However, the majority's
application of Moore in this case diminished Moore's "primary concern"", 3 of
avoiding secret interrogations by informants that are the equivalent of police
interrogations, and also diminished the right to counsel the Moore rule was
designed to protect. First, the court ignored the critical fact found by the district
court-that the prosecutor's placement of Johnson in the same jail as a known
informant was motivated by an intent to circumvent Johnson's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel-without any mention of clear error. "4 By not affording proper
deference to the district court's finding, the majority diminished the importance
of the Sixth Amendment right. Second, by ignoring the district court's finding
of fact, the court sent a signal that the affirmative obligation required byMoulton
is not a significant consideration in the Eighth Circuit. Third, although the court
recognized that implied instructions can satisfy the Moore test, the court
diminished the importance of the right to counsel by not explaining why the
implied instructions in this case were insufficient to satisfy the test.

109. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).

111. Id. at 926 (Bye, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v.
Clarke, 939 F.2d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 1991)).
112. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
113. United States v. Moore, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1999).
114. Johnson, 338 F.3d 918; see United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751,
753 (8th Cir. 2001) ("When a district court grants a motion to suppress evidence, we
review its findings of fact for clear error.
").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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As Judge Bye noted in his dissent, the fact that the prosecutor intentionally
placed Johnson in the Benton County Jail"' is never discussed in the majority
opinion." 6 According to the standard of appellate review in the Eighth Circuit,
an appellate court is free to disregard a lower court's finding of fact only on the
basis of clear error." 7 Nevertheless, the Johnson court disregarded the crucial
fact of the prosecutor's intent without any discussion of clear error."'
That the court disregarded the prosecutor's intent shows that the court
minimized the importance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As the
Supreme Court has consistently explained, the right to counsel is an
indispensable feature of the American justice system." 9 In the instant case, the
district court found that the prosecutor intentionally denied Johnson her right to
counsel.' ° The prosecutor intentionally sent Johnson to a specific jail, for the
specific purpose of putting her in close proximity with a prior government
informant who had earned a particular reputation for extracting incriminating
information from criminal defendants.' The district court's finding alone does
not satisfy the Massiah test, but by ignoring this intentional act designed to skirt
Johnson's right to counsel, the majority appeared not to recognize the importance
of this fundamental feature of our criminal justice system.
Second, by disregarding the trial court finding, the court appeared to ignore
the Moulton requirement that prosecutors have an affirmative duty not to act in
a manner that circumvents the accused's Sixth Amendment protections.'

115. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 924-25 (Bye, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 924 (Bye, J., dissenting).
117. Guevara-Martinez,262 F.3d at 753.
118. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 918-23.
119. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 (1985) ("The right to the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is
indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.");
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984) (stating that accused's right to
counsel is "pervasive" and "a fundamental component of our criminal justice system");
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (stating that the Sixth Amendment is
"indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice");
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) ("The assistance of counsel is often a
requisite to the very existence of a fair trial."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462
(1938) (noting that the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee is necessary to ensure
fundamental rights).
120. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 924-25 (Bye, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Bye, J., dissenting).
122. The government prosecutor is presumed to know that placing a pretrial
defendant in a jail cell in close proximity to another inmate who has a propensity to
inform will lead the informant to take steps to obtain incriminating information from the
defendant. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980). The Third Circuit has
recognized that such an action can "represent a deliberate effort to obtain incriminating
information from a prisoner in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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Although the court did not blatantly disregard the rule of Moulton, it signaled
that the affirmative obligation required by Moulton was not an important
consideration in the court's decision.
The court's decision not to apply Moulton is troubling because it sends a
message to prosecutors that some intentional acts that evade the protections of
the right to counsel will be tolerated by the court. Explicit behavior will always
be sufficient to trigger a Massiah violation.'2 3 But by not recognizing the danger
of the implicit acts of the prosecutor, the court is sending a signal to prosecutors
that if they are sneaky enough, the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment will not
protect the accused. This message is inconsistent with Massiah's protection
against deliberate interference with the right to counsel. 4 This message is also
inconsistent with the substance of Moore-thatsecret interrogations that are the
equivalent of police interrogations will not be tolerated by the court.'25
Furthermore, the court's action is inconsistent with defendants' vital need to be
aided by counsel during "the most critical period of the proceedings against
[them], . .. the time of their arraignment[s] until the beginning of their
trial[s]."' 26 Surreptitious acts at trial equivalent to what prosecutors may be
permitted to do before trial would not be tolerated by the court.2 7 Even though
the right to counsel is just as important, if not more important, to the accused
before trial as during trial, the Johnson court has apparently developed a
different standard for pre-trial misconduct. These inconsistencies lessen the
significance of Sixth Amendment protection.
Third, the court minimized the importance of the Sixth Amendment by
ignoring the prosecutor's established intent while simultaneously holding that
implied instructions can satisfy the Moore test. The prosecutor's actions were
a crucial part of this case because, as Judge Bye argued, the prosecutor intended
United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994).
123. In Johnson, all parties agreed that once McNeese received the listening-post
instructions, he was acting as a government agent. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 920.
124. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
125. Moore v.United States, 178 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Kuhlmann
v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986)).
126. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
127. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 53:

Suppose, for example, that during a trial the prosecutor enlisted an informant
to approach and speak with the defendant in the courtroom while the jury

watched from a nearby room. Alternatively, imagine that an undercover agent
with a transmitter broadcasted a lunch break conversation with the accused into
the courtroom while a judge or jury listened. In either situation, whether

counsel was absent, present at the encounter, or listening with the factfinder,
the government's conduct would violate the sixth amendment. It would
deprive the defendant ofcounsel's advice concerning a vital decision-whether
to divulge unique knowledge regarding guilt or innocence to the authorities and
to the trier of fact.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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for McNeese to interpret them as implied instructions to obtain incriminating
information from Johnson. 2 By ignoring the district court's finding that the
prosecutor's actions were intended to circumvent Johnson's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, however, the majority eliminated the possibility of finding that
McNeese received an implied instruction. Not surprisingly, then, when the court
applied the bright-line rule of Moore it concluded that neither express nor
implied instructions were given to McNeese before September 11, 2000.29 But
in stating this conclusion, the court recognized that implied instructions could
satisfy the Moore test. Because the court recognized that implied instructions
could satisfy the test while simultaneously disregarding evidence of implied
instructions in this case, the court was very unclear about what kind of implied
instructions, if any, would truly satisfy Moore.
That the court did not articulate its reasons for concluding that no implied
instructions were given in this case is disturbing. First, by not mentioning the
crucial fact that the prosecutor intentionally placed Johnson in the jail with
McNeese, the majority calls into question the sensibleness of its decision. As
Judge Bye explained, this fact could certainly be interpreted as an implied
instruction, and it was interpreted by McNeese as such an instruction. 30 But by
not explaining why the prosecutor's intent was not considered, or why the
circumstances in this case do not amount to an implied instruction, the court was
unclear about whether it even considered what kinds of implied instructions
could satisfy Moore. Leaving this question unanswered did a great disservice to
Ms. Johnson, who deserves to know why her incriminating statements were
deemed admissible, as well as to other citizens, who deserve to know under what
circumstances they will not be afforded the protection of the Sixth Amendment.
In each of the three ways described above, the Eighth Circuit has restricted
the protection of Moore and diminished the value of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. The Sixth Amendment embodies a weighty clash, however, between
the fundamental principles of the justice system and the essential use of

128. Johnson, 338 F.3d at 925 (Bye, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 921.
130. Id. at 925 (Bye, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit, in UnitedStates v. York,

supports the argument that past conduct between a government agent and an informant
can constitute an agreement to establish the informant's agency: "Agreements, of
course, don't have to be explicit or formal, and are often inferred from evidence that the
parties behaved as though there were an agreement between them, following a particular
course ofconduct over a sustained period of time." United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343
(7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th

Cir. 1999). Also, the Third Circuit has recognized that an informant could have a tacit
agreement with the government if (1) the informant previously gave information to the
government on other cases for some benefit, and (2) the informant elicited additional
information from the defendant with the hope that the cooperation would result in a
sentence reduction. United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/6
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undercover informants in effective law enforcement.'"' Courts interpreting the
Sixth Amendment must constantly balance the societal interest in effective law
enforcement against the societal interest in being protected from overzealous
police conduct.' 32 Thus, a possible explanation for the court's decision in
Johnson is that, in this case, the cost to law enforcement was greater than the
cost to society of abrogating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the
absence of explicit attempts by the government to obtain incriminating
information. The cost of enforcing the right to counsel in this case was that the
government would lose the ability to use probative evidence of an extremely
serious crime-the murder of five witnesses. But the cost to society of not
enforcing the right is the inability to protect itself against police conduct
designed to surreptitiously obtain incriminating information despite the
attachment of the right. Not enforcing the right to counsel in cases like Johnson
would reduce the protections necessary for our adversarial justice system to work
fairly and effectively.' 33 This is simply not a cost society should have to bear.3 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment affords defendants protection from the government's
overzealous use of undercover informants to obtain incriminating information.
According to the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Johnson,however, prosecutors in
the Eighth Circuit enjoy wider latitude to use implicit or tacit agreements with
informants to circumvent a defendant's right to counsel than was envisioned in
previous Supreme Court cases such as Henry. Thus, while law enforcement
interests are furthered by the use of these "wink and nod" agreements, Johnson's
(and society's) interest in ensuring that fair play exists within our adversarial
justice system is severely diminished.
DANIEL E. KIRSCH

131. Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 2-3.
132. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984) (noting that
exclusionary rules are the balancing of these interests).
133. Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 55.
134. United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795,903 (N.D. Iowa 2002), rev'd,
338 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2003).
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